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H O N O R A B L E  M E N T I O N
Prosecutorial Discretion and 
Environmental Crime
by David M . Uhlmann
David M . Uhlmann is the Jeffrey F . Liss Professor from Practice and Director of the 
Environmental Law and Policy Program, University of Michigan Law School .
The environmental laws create a complex regulatory system affecting a wide range of economic activity in the United States . The Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) establishes a cradle-to-grave 
regulatory scheme for hazardous wastes; the Clean Water 
Act (CWA) regulates all discharges of pollutants into 
waters of the United States; and the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
imposes limits on all air pollutants that could endanger 
public health and welfare . As with any complex regulatory 
scheme, there are significant disparities in the serious-
ness of environmental violations . Some involve devastat-
ing pollution, evacuation of communities, or deliberate 
efforts to mislead regulators . Others may be de minimis 
violations or isolated events that occur notwithstanding a 
robust compliance program .
Given the wide range of potential environmental vio-
lations, it might have been preferable for Congress to 
specify which environmental violations could result in 
criminal prosecution . Instead, Congress made only lim-
ited distinctions between acts that could result in crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative enforcement . Even the most 
technical violation of the environmental laws theoretically 
could result in criminal prosecution if the defendant acted 
with the mental state specified by the statute . Mental state 
is not required for civil or administrative violations, but 
the additional proof required for criminal prosecution 
often does little to differentiate between criminal, civil, 
and administrative violations . In most cases, the govern-
ment must show only that the defendant acted knowingly . 
In other words, the government must show defendants 
know they are engaging in the conduct that is a violation 
of the law; the government is not required to show that 
defendants know they are breaking the environmental 
laws . Indeed, in some cases, the government is required to 
prove only that the defendant acted negligently; in other 
cases, the government is not required to show any mental 
state at all .
If the same violation often could give rise to criminal, 
civil, or administrative enforcement—and if mental state 
requirements only preclude criminal enforcement for a 
small subset of violations—what determines which envi-
ronmental violations result in criminal prosecution? The 
answer is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which 
exists in all areas of the criminal law, but assumes a par-
ticularly critical role in environmental cases because so 
much conduct falls within the criminal provisions of the 
environmental laws . Critics of environmental criminal 
enforcement argue that Congress gave too much discre-
tion to prosecutors or, even worse from their perspective, 
to EPA enforcement officials . They note that whether a 
case is prosecuted criminally may be determined by noth-
ing more substantive than whether the case originates 
with a criminal investigator or with one of their civil or 
administrative counterparts within the agency . Even sup-
porters of criminal enforcement acknowledge that prose-
cutorial discretion is broad under the environmental laws . 
But they insist that it is no greater than in other areas of 
economic or regulatory crime and that Congress properly 
relied on the good sense of prosecutors, the wisdom of 
judges, and the judgment of juries to determine when vio-
lators of the environmental laws should be convicted of 
criminal activity .
I see no merit in debating whether prosecutorial dis-
cretion is broad under the environmental laws—it clearly 
is—and I concede that it may be disquieting in a nation 
predicated on the rule of law that we depend so much 
on individual prosecutors to determine what conduct 
should be criminally prosecuted . I also acknowledge that 
the extent of prosecutorial discretion under the environ-
mental laws may raise uncertainty in the regulated com-
munity about which environmental violations will result 
in criminal prosecution . On the other hand, our criminal 
justice system always relies to some degree upon the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion to determine which viola-
tions will be prosecuted criminally . To evaluate whether 
prosecutors have too much discretion—and to address 
The full version of this Article was originally published as: David 
M . Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 
38 Harv . Envtl . L . Rev . 159 (2014) . It has been excerpted with 
permission of Harvard Environmental Law Review and David 
M. Uhlmann. Please see the full article for footnotes and sources.
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claims that the environmental laws criminalize too much 
conduct—we need to know more about the circumstances 
under which environmental prosecutors exercise their dis-
cretion to seek criminal charges for violations .
For environmental crimes, I have written that prosecu-
tors should exercise their discretion to reserve criminal 
enforcement for cases with one or more of the following 
aggravating factors: (1) significant environmental harm or 
public health effects; (2) deceptive or misleading conduct; 
(3) operating outside the regulatory system; or (4) repeti-
tive violations .1 Limiting criminal enforcement to cases 
with one or more of these aggravating factors would pre-
clude prosecution for technical or de minimis violations 
and provide greater clarity about which environmental 
violations might result in criminal charges . The presence 
of one or more of these factors also would delineate an 
appropriate role for criminal prosecution in the environ-
mental regulatory scheme by limiting criminal prosecution 
to cases involving substantial harm or risk of harm or to 
cases in which the conduct involves the type of deliberate 
misconduct we consider criminal in other contexts as well .
My views about prosecutorial discretion for environ-
mental crime draw on my experience serving for seven-
teen years as a federal environmental crimes prosecutor, 
including seven as Chief of the Environmental Crimes 
Section when I was responsible for approving all charg-
ing decisions in cases brought by my office . The factors 
track what EPA has identified as significant in its exercise 
of investigative discretion and draw from the Principles 
of Federal Prosecution that govern all criminal cases 
brought by the Justice Department . But my former office 
does not handle all cases prosecuted under the federal 
environmental laws—the remainder are prosecuted by 
United States Attorneys—and the office does not require 
the presence of any specific aggravating factors to justify 
criminal charges . As a result, in my prior scholarship, I 
could not show the extent to which my normative model 
is descriptive as well .
I therefore created the Environmental Crimes Project 
to analyze the extent to which the aggravating factors 
I have identified as normatively desirable were present 
in recent prosecutions . Over a three-year period, with 
research assistance from 120 students at the University of 
Michigan Law School, we reviewed all cases investigated 
by EPA from 2005–2010 . To ensure a representative data 
set, we focused on defendants charged in federal court 
with pollution crime or related Title 18 offenses . We con-
ducted our review based on court documents for over 
600 cases involving nearly 900 defendants . In addition to 
analyzing the aggravating factors, we also compiled data 
regarding the types of defendants charged, the judicial 
districts and EPA regions involved, the statutes charged, 
and the outcomes of the cases . In the process, we devel-
oped a comprehensive database of information about pol-
1 . See David M . Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution 
of Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 4 Utah L . 
Rev . 1223, 1246-52 (2009) .
lution cases investigated by EPA from 2005–2010 that 
resulted in federal criminal charges .
Based on our research, I have determined that one or 
more aggravating factors were present in 96% of envi-
ronmental criminal prosecutions from 2005–2010 . This 
finding supports at least two significant conclusions . 
First, in exercising their discretion to bring criminal 
charges, prosecutors almost always focus on violations 
that include one or more of the aggravating factors I have 
identified . Second, violations that do not include one of 
those aggravating factors are not likely to be prosecuted 
criminally . I cannot say whether these aggravating factors 
will trigger criminal prosecution; declined cases are not 
public, so we do not have a control group of cases where 
prosecutors decided not to pursue criminal charges . Nor 
could we create a comparison group of civil matters, 
because civil cases involve notice pleading and most are 
resolved by consent decrees that do not identify whether 
there were aggravating factors . Indeed, I would expect 
that civil and administrative cases also involve at least 
significant harm and repetitive violations (deceptive or 
misleading conduct, in my experience, is likely to result 
in a referral for criminal enforcement) . Nonetheless, my 
finding that criminal enforcement is reserved for cases 
involving at least one of the aggravating factors I have 
identified should provide greater clarity about the role of 
environmental criminal enforcement and reduce uncer-
tainty in the regulated community about which environ-
mental violations might lead to criminal charges .
This excerpted version of my article has two Parts . Part 
I focuses on the presence or absence of the individual 
aggravating factors in each case . Part II analyzes how 
often multiple aggravating factors are present and assesses 
defendants with no aggravating factors . Based on the 
empirical evidence presented here, I conclude that crimi-
nal enforcement has been reserved for violations with the 
aggravating factors I have identified, which suggests that 
prosecutors have exercised their discretion in ways that 
should ameliorate concerns about over-criminalization .
I. The Presence of Individual Aggravating 
Factors in Environmental Criminal 
Prosecutions
In this Part, I provide the results of our efforts to deter-
mine whether the individual aggravating factors I have 
identified were present in pollution prosecutions initiated 
from 2005–2010 . We determined that 96% of the defen-
dants (828 out of 864 defendants) engaged in conduct 
involving at least one of the four aggravating factors . The 
most prevalent aggravating factors were repetitive viola-
tions (78% or 679 defendants) and deceptive or mislead-
ing conduct (63% or 545 defendants) . The third most 
common factor was operating outside the regulatory 
scheme (33% or 287 defendants), followed by defendants 
who caused significant harm (17% or 144 defendants) . 
These findings are shown in Figure 1 below:
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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These results support two significant conclusions, both 
of which suggest that criminal enforcement was reserved 
for culpable conduct under the environmental laws from 
2005–2010 .
First, one or more aggravating factors are present for nearly 
all defendants prosecuted under the environmental laws. 
This is a significant finding in light of over-criminaliza-
tion claims, since it suggests that criminal enforcement is 
reserved for conduct involving the aggravating factors that, 
under my normative model, might warrant criminal pros-
ecution . It also may help address randomness claims about 
criminal enforcement, since it suggests that prosecutorial 
discretion may follow a distinctive pattern by focusing on 
defendants who engage in conduct involving one or more 
aggravating factors .
Second, it is unlikely that there will be a criminal prosecu-
tion if no aggravating factor is present . We identified only a 
small number of defendants (36) who engaged in conduct 
that did not involve one of the aggravating factors . This 
finding suggests that prosecutors are unlikely to pursue 
criminal charges for violations of the environmental laws 
that do not involve significant harm, deceptive or mislead-
ing conduct, facilities operating outside the regulatory 
system, or repetitive violations . It also may help mitigate 
concerns that prosecutors are targeting technical violations 
and defendants who acted in good faith .
In the Sections that follow, I present data and analysis 
regarding each of the aggravating factors .2
2 . We obtained the same results when we analyzed at the case level: nearly 
96% of all cases (635 out of 664 cases) involved at least one of the aggravat-
ing factors . We also achieved nearly identical results when we analyzed the 
individual aggravating factors at the case level: 17% for significant harm; 
59% for deceptive or misleading conduct; 33% for operating outside the 
A. Significant Environmental Harm/Public 
Health Effects
Cases involving significant environmental 
harm and public health effects often receive 
attention from investigators and prosecutors . 
EPA emphasizes environmental harm and 
public health effects in its memorandum to 
investigators regarding the proper exercise of 
investigative discretion . Prosecutors also focus 
on these cases for a practical reason—they 
are more compelling for judges and juries . In 
white collar cases generally and environmen-
tal cases in particular, prosecutors worry that 
jury nullification may occur if they prove only 
the elements of the charged offenses without 
providing juries with a narrative that allows 
them to view the conduct as morally culpable .
Our study focused on five types of harm: 
(1) serious bodily injury or death; (2) know-
ing or negligent endangerment; (3) animal 
deaths; (4) cleanup costs; and (5) evacuations 
and emergency responses . At least one of these 
factors was present for 15% of the defendants 
in our study (131 of the 864 defendants) . Significant envi-
ronmental harm that did not fit into one of the five factors 
listed above was present for an additional 13 defendants . 
Overall, 17% of the defendants included in our study (144 
of the 864 defendants) were charged with conduct involv-
ing significant environmental harm, a statistically signifi-
cant percentage but the smallest of the four aggravating 
factors analyzed .
While our data suggest that significant harm was caused 
by only one-sixth of the criminal defendants, it merits 
emphasis that we focused on conduct where harm appeared 
to be a distinctive “plus” factor in criminal cases . Most pol-
lution crime involves risk of environmental harm or public 
health effects, since those factors are present whenever pol-
lutants and hazardous wastes are improperly stored, dis-
posed, discharged, or released into the environment . If we 
had included all potential contamination cases—for exam-
ple, every CWA discharge case, every RCRA storage and 
disposal case, and all of the CAA asbestos cases—the harm 
numbers would have been much higher, involving 73% of 
all cases (484 out of 664 cases) . Stated differently, harm or 
the potential for harm is present in most environmental 
cases or they would not be violations at all . Our challenge 
in examining prosecutorial discretion factors was to iden-
tify cases where harm was aggravated and therefore might 
be a reason the case was criminally prosecuted . It is in this 
narrower understanding of harm that the number of cases 
may be limited .
regulatory system; and 76% for repetitive violations . We present results here 
and in Part II based on defendants .
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B. Deceptive or Misleading Conduct
Deceptive or misleading conduct undermines the effec-
tiveness of environmental protection in at least three ways . 
First, deceptive conduct, such as the use of bypass lines or 
midnight dumping, can allow illegal pollution to go unde-
tected . Second, the environmental laws largely involve an 
honor system where companies must seek permits or other 
authorization for pollution activities and then must moni-
tor and self-report their compliance . When companies 
do not conduct required monitoring or honestly report 
their pollution activity, they undermine the self-policing 
required under the environmental laws . Third, mislead-
ing conduct deprives regulators of accurate information 
about overall levels of pollution, which they need to make 
informed decisions about what pollution to permit .
I have suggested that lying is the most significant factor 
in making a criminal case out of what otherwise might be 
a civil or administrative violation . If this premise is true 
and a high percentage of criminal cases involve decep-
tive or misleading conduct, it could address concerns that 
law-abiding individuals are being unfairly targeted with 
criminal prosecution . I would argue that individuals who 
misrepresent facts regarding their compliance with legal 
requirements are not acting in good faith . Moreover, all 
corporations and individuals are expected to be honest in 
their statements and submissions to the government . False 
statements, concealment, and obstruction of justice are 
therefore criminal under both the environmental laws and 
Title 18 of the United States Code .
Over 60% of the defendants included in our study 
committed violations involving deceptive or misleading 
conduct (63%, or 544 of 864 defendants) . This finding is 
significant because it suggests that the majority of those 
charged as environmental criminals engage in conduct 
that is viewed as culpable in other areas of the criminal 
law as well . To better understand this factor, we ana-
lyzed deceptive or misleading conduct based on whether 
it occurred during (1) the commission of the underlying 
offense (e .g ., by using a bypass line to circumvent pollution 
control equipment), (2) reporting or recordkeeping (e .g ., 
falsifying documents to conceal pollution control activity), 
or (3) a cover-up after the violations occurred (e .g ., lying to 
investigators and destroying evidence of a crime) .
More than 36% of the defendants in our study (313 of 
864 defendants) engaged in deceptive or misleading con-
duct in the commission of their violations . Nearly 39% 
of the defendants in our study (336 of 864 defendants) 
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct when submit-
ting required reports of pollution activity or in maintain-
ing required compliance records . More than 24% of the 
defendants (209 of 864 defendants) engaged in some type 
of after-the-fact effort to conceal violations from regulators .
Perhaps as significantly, nearly one-half of the defen-
dants engaging in deceptive or misleading conduct did 
so in multiple ways . Of the 544 defendants who engaged 
in deceptive or misleading conduct, 106 defendants were 
involved solely in deception during the commission of the 
offense, 123 defendants were involved in deception solely 
during reporting or recordkeeping, and 80 defendants were 
engaged in deceptive conduct solely during cover-up activ-
ity . The remaining 236 defendants, or 43%, were engaged 
in two or more types of deceptive activity .
Deceptive or misleading conduct inculpates both for its 
own sake—both law and ethics demand that we be truth-
ful—and because of what it reveals about the mental state 
of the majority of criminal defendants in environmental 
cases . It has long been argued that the complexity of the 
environmental laws lays a trap for the uninformed, and that 
reduced mental state requirements compound the problem 
by criminalizing conduct that defendants had no idea was 
unlawful, let alone criminal . Our study’s findings concern-
ing the prevalence of deceptive or misleading conduct do 
not mean that the environmental laws are not complex or 
that their criminal provisions are not far reaching . The fact 
that so many of the defendants charged as environmental 
criminals engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct, 
however, may undercut the argument that the government 
is prosecuting individuals who make good-faith efforts to 
comply and do not engage in any culpable behavior .
C. Operating Outside the Regulatory System
The third factor that I have argued may warrant criminal 
enforcement involves companies that operate outside the 
regulatory scheme . Like many modern statutory schemes, 
the environmental laws impose substantial regulatory 
requirements on facilities across the United States . It is no 
longer credible for companies to claim ignorance of the fact 
that their conduct may be regulated . Companies that par-
ticipate in the regulatory system do so at substantial cost 
and should not be at a competitive disadvantage when com-
pared to companies that fail to meet their legal obligations . 
In addition, as noted earlier, the government depends upon 
complete and accurate information about pollution activity 
in order to operate an effective permitting system . When 
companies fail to participate in the regulatory system, the 
government has no mechanism for taking into account 
their pollution activity, leading to a lack of information that 
could undermine environmental protection efforts .
Whether such behavior warrants criminal enforcement, 
of course, is a separate question from whether the govern-
ment must take enforcement action to promote compliance 
efforts . In some instances, criminal enforcement may be 
appropriate . If a company transports hazardous waste to 
facilities that are not permitted to receive it, for example, 
there is a significant potential that the waste will be stored 
unsafely or disposed of illegally . Likewise, if a company 
stores or disposes of hazardous waste without a permit, 
there is a correspondingly significant risk that the public 
may be exposed to harmful hazardous waste and that toxic 
pollutants will contaminate the environment . Conversely, 
civil or administrative enforcement may be more appropri-
ate when the failure to operate within the regulatory system 
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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involves notification or recordkeeping require-
ments, or if there is evidence that a defendant failed 
to comply with permitting requirements because of 
a good-faith misunderstanding about whether its 
activities were regulated .
Nearly one-third of the defendants charged 
with environmental crimes operated outside the 
regulatory system (33% or 287 out of 864 defen-
dants) . Of those 287 defendants, 85% failed to 
obtain permits required under the environmental 
laws or transported hazardous wastes to facili-
ties that were not permitted to receive hazardous 
waste . Slightly less than 15% of defendants who 
operated outside the regulatory system failed to 
maintain required records; 5 .6% of those defen-
dants failed to monitor for pollution activity, and 
30% failed to report pollution .
Significantly, most defendants charged with failure to 
maintain records, failure to monitor, or failure to report 
also committed another subcategory of violation . Only one 
defendant over the six-year period covered by the study was 
charged solely with recordkeeping violations, and only three 
defendants were charged solely with failure to monitor vio-
lations . The numbers were higher for failure to report pol-
lution activity, including 18 defendants or approximately 
2% of all defendants charged with environmental crime . 
In contrast, there were 184 defendants charged solely 
with either failure to obtain a permit or permit violations, 
accounting for 21% of all defendants .
The overwhelming number of defendants charged with 
permit violations—both alone and in combination with 
other acts properly characterized as operating outside the 
regulatory system—suggests that prosecutors have exer-
cised their discretion to focus on the type of actions that 
most undermine the regulatory system and generally do 
not prosecute when the violations are more technical .
D. Repetitive Violations
The fourth category of cases that I have asserted might be 
appropriate for criminal prosecution is repetitive violations . 
We focused on the duration of the charged misconduct 
and of any other relevant conduct to identify the extent 
to which criminal charges were based on repetitive viola-
tions . We considered two types of repetitive violations to 
be potentially aggravating: first, single violations that were 
egregious enough that they continued for multiple days, 
weeks, months, or years; and, second, multiple violations 
that occurred over a period of days, weeks, months, or years .
More than three-quarters of the defendants in our data-
base committed violations that lasted more than a day 
(79% or 679 out of 864 defendants) . We then sorted to 
determine how many of those defendants committed vio-
lations that either lasted more than a week, more than a 
month, or more than a year or that had harmful effects 
over a comparable period of time . We found that the largest 
number of defendants who engaged in repetitive conduct 
committed violations that lasted more than a year (41% or 
351 defendants who engaged in repetitive violations) . The 
results for duration of violations are summarized in Figure 
2, above .
These findings admit to competing interpretations about 
the significance of repetitive violations . On the one hand, 
as noted above, more than three-quarters of the defendants 
committed violations that lasted more than one day . Of 
that group, 84% committed violations that lasted more 
than one month and 52% committed violations that lasted 
more than one year . Those findings suggest that duration 
is often an aggravating factor in environmental criminal 
prosecutions—and that most defendants commit viola-
tions over a period of months or years .
On the other hand, more than a fifth of defendants 
(21%) committed violations that occurred on a single day . 
Indeed, just over one-quarter of all defendants (27%) com-
mitted violations that did not last more than one week . 
Those findings suggest that, while environmental criminal 
cases most often involve violations lasting a month or lon-
ger, a significant percentage of cases involve violations of 
relatively limited duration .
We examined the single-day defendants more closely 
to determine whether factors were present that might 
explain why isolated misconduct resulted in criminal 
charges . We determined that 80% of the defendants 
engaged in misconduct that involved at least one of the 
other aggravating factors, with 50% of the defendants 
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct . The pres-
ence of those aggravating factors might be sufficient to 
justify criminal prosecution . Moreover, the fact that 
charges are focused on a single day does not mean that 
the misconduct was limited to a single day; prosecutors 
may have agreed to charge a single day of violation as part 
of a plea agreement . Nonetheless, cases involving isolated 
misconduct merit caution; an isolated violation should be 
more egregious to warrant criminal enforcement .3
3 . There were 36 defendants who did not commit repetitive violations who 
also did not engage in conduct involving any of the other aggravating fac-
tors . The charges for these defendants fall outside my normative model . I 
analyze them in Part II, Section B infra, to determine whether or not they 
appear to be marginal cases for criminal prosecution .




































8-31 days 32-365 days 366+ days
Copyright © 2015 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
45 ELR 10806 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 8-2015
II. Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Aggravating Factors and Prosecutorial 
Discretion
In this Part, I analyze the data regarding the presence of 
aggravating factors in environmental prosecutions from 
two perspectives . First, I analyze how often multiple aggra-
vating factors were present in the database and whether 
there appears to be any relationships among the factors . 
Second, I examine cases with no aggravating factors to 
determine whether they reveal marginal cases .
A. Multiple Aggravating Factors and the 
Relationships Between Aggravating Factors
As Part I explained, aggravating factors were present for 
96% of the defendants in our six-year dataset (828 out of 
864 defendants) . To better understand the role of these 
aggravating factors, I also analyzed how often multiple fac-
tors were present and considered the relationship between 
factors . Two or more aggravating factors were present for 
74% of the defendants (638 out of 864 defendants) . The 
fact that such a high percentage of defendants had multiple 
aggravating factors suggests a higher level of egregiousness 
than would be present if most defendants had only a sin-
gle aggravating factor . Our data regarding the number of 
aggravating factors is presented in Figure 3:
An analysis of these data supports three additional 
findings regarding the aggravating factors in environmen-
tal crimes .
First, one of the first three factors (all factors other than 
repetitiveness) was present for 88% of the defendants (761 
out of 864 defendants). In other words, most defendants 
were charged for violations that involved harm, deceptive 
or misleading conduct, or operating outside the regula-
tory scheme . These findings may suggest a further refine-
ment of my overall conclusions from Part I: (1) in most 
instances, prosecutors have reserved criminal prosecution 
for defendants with one of the first three aggravating fac-
tors; and (2) defendants who engage in conduct that does 
not involve one of the first three factors are unlikely to face 
criminal charges .
Second, repetitiveness often is present when criminal charges 
are brought but rarely is the sole aggravating factor. Repeti-
tiveness was the most prevalent of the four factors, account-
ing for 79% of the defendants (679 out of 864 defendants) . 
Repetitiveness was the sole aggravating factor, however, 
for only 10% of the defendants who committed repetitive 
violations (67 out of 679 defendants), which is the lowest 
for any aggravating factor .4 Stated differently, 90% of the 
defendants who committed repetitive violations (612 out 
of 679 defendants) also had at least one other aggravating 
factor . These findings suggest that, while prosecutors may 
prefer to charge repetitive violations, repetitiveness alone 
may not be driving charging decisions .
Third, more than 71% of defendants (612 out of 864 
defendants) engaged in conduct that involved one of the first 
three factors (significant harm, deceptive conduct, operat-
ing outside the regulatory system) and repetitiveness . Since 
most environmental crimes involve one of the first three 
aggravating factors (88% of all defendants) and most envi-
ronmental crimes involve repetitive violations (79% of all 
defendants), we would expect to see one of the first three 
factors present along with repetitiveness in a high percent-
age of cases . But the relationship was even stronger when 
we looked at multi-factor defendants . Repetitiveness was 
present for 96% of the defendants with two or more aggra-
vating factors (612 out of 638 defendants) . For 
defendants with two factors, repetitiveness was 
present for 94% of the defendants (443 out of 469 
defendants) .5 The pairing of repetitiveness with one 
or more of the other aggravating factors was the 
most dominant multi-factor relationship when cal-
culated as a percentage of all defendants (71% of all 
defendants) .6 This finding suggests that prosecutors 
often reserve criminal prosecution for violations 
that involve both one of the first three factors and 
repetitiveness and are less likely to bring criminal 
charges if that relationship is absent .
We found evidence of other relationships among 
the aggravating factors . Deceptive or misleading 
conduct occurred least frequently in combination 
with the factors of significant harm and operat-
ing outside the regulatory system . We found 545 
defendants who engaged in deceptive or mislead-
ing conduct; only 11% of those defendants (58 defendants) 
engaged in conduct that resulted in significant harm . In 
4 . Operating outside the regulatory system also is the sole aggravating factor 
in only 11% of the cases where it is present (30 out of 281 defendants) . In 
contrast, deceptive or misleading conduct is the sole aggravating factor for 
36% of the defendants who engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct 
(136 out of 547 defendants) .
5 . Of course, most defendants in our dataset committed repetitive violations, 
so I would expect to see a significant overlap between repetitive violations 
and other factors . Still, it is revealing that the other three factors were pres-
ent so often and that repetitiveness appeared by itself so infrequently .
6 . The combination of one of the first three factors and repetitiveness also is 
the most dominant relationship as a percentage of all cases, accounting for 
68% of all cases in the dataset (450 out of 664 cases) .
Figure 3. Defendants Charged by 
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other words, significant harm was present as a percentage 
of defendants involved in deceptive or misleading con-
duct less frequently than in our dataset as a whole (17% 
of all defendants) . More of the defendants who engaged in 
deceptive or misleading conduct were operating outside the 
regulatory system (21% or 117 defendants) but a relatively 
modest amount overall and, as with harm, less often than 
in our dataset as a whole (where it was present for 33% of 
all defendants) .
Deceptive or misleading conduct was present as the 
sole aggravating factor more often than it was paired with 
significant harm . Deceptive or misleading conduct was 
the sole aggravating factor for 14% of the defendants who 
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct (78 out of 
545 defendants) . For defendants who had only one aggra-
vating factor, deceptive or misleading conduct appeared 
more often than any other aggravating factor both in raw 
numbers (the next largest category was repetitive viola-
tions, which was the sole aggravating factor for 67 defen-
dants) and as a percentage of defendants possessing that 
factor (the next largest category was significant harm at 
11% of all significant harm defendants) . As with other 
aggravating factors, most defendants who engaged in 
deceptive or misleading conduct also committed repeti-
tive violations (83% or 452 out of 545 defendants), which 
suggests that deceptive or misleading conduct is charged 
most often when it occurs more than once . It merits 
emphasis, though, that deceptive and misleading con-
duct was charged most often as a standalone factor—and 
appeared the most often of the first three aggravating fac-
tors . As noted previously, in my experience, deceptive or 
misleading conduct is the most significant factor in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion .
Conversely, we found that there appeared to be at least 
some positive relationship between significant harm and 
operating outside the regulatory system . The correlation 
was not particularly strong: we saw both significant harm 
and operating outside the regulatory system for 60 defen-
dants (41% of significant harm defendants and 21% of 
defendants operating outside the regulatory system) . Yet 
both were present slightly more often together than they 
were present in the dataset as a whole (operating outside the 
regulatory system was present for 33% of all defendants; 
significant harm was present for 17% of all defendants) . 
In addition, even a modest correlation between significant 
harm and operating outside the regulatory system may be 
noteworthy, since the regulatory system seeks to protect 
public health and the environment from harm (and the 
risk of harm) .
B. Defendants With No Aggravating Factors Present
For 36 of the defendants in our database, we determined 
that none of the four aggravating factors was present . We 
examined each case individually to determine whether, 
based on the conduct described in the court documents, any 
involved questionable exercise of prosecutorial discretion .
For the 36 defendants with no aggravating factors, 17 
defendants committed violations that, while insufficient to 
code as “operating outside the regulatory system,” nonethe-
less involved core subcategory violations such as failing to 
obtain a permit . For example, in nearly all of the RCRA 
cases in the database, the defendant engaged in conduct 
that at least involved failing to acquire the requisite permit, 
which is a subset of culpability under operating outside the 
regulatory system . But not all of those defendants were 
coded as operating outside the regulatory system because 
they might have been partially operating within the regula-
tory system .
Perhaps there might be circumstances where the failure 
to obtain a permit reflected good-faith misunderstanding 
of the permitting requirement or, in the RCRA context, 
the definition of hazardous waste . In those circumstances, 
prosecutors might choose to exercise their discretion to 
decline prosecution in favor of civil or administrative 
enforcement . By itself, however, there is nothing about 
prosecution for failure to obtain regulatory permits that 
signals prosecutorial overreaching . The obligation to 
acquire and maintain valid permits for pollution activity 
or to store and dispose of hazardous waste is not an arcane 
or obscure regulatory requirement .
Only 19 defendants engaged in conduct that was not 
captured by any category or subcategory . We analyzed 
each of these cases and found that researchers had noted 
explanatory “additional aggravating factors” that may have 
influenced prosecutors for six defendants . For example, one 
prosecution involved safety violations occurring in schools, 
which may have prompted the prosecutor to pursue crimi-
nal charges . Another prosecution involved conduct that 
appeared to blatantly disregard the law but was not cap-
tured by one of the aggravating factors .
As a result, most prosecutions with no aggravating fac-
tors involved either a subcategory of operating outside 
the regulatory system or an additional aggravating factor . 
Only 13 defendants engaged in conduct where prosecu-
tion could not be justified by a subcategory or additional 
aggravating factor . Of that number, nine defendants were 
charged in an indictment or information that merely 
recited the elements of the offense . It is far easier to iden-
tify aggravating factors in so-called speaking indictments, 
where prosecutors provided additional details about the 
misconduct, including the type of evidence that fit within 
the aggravating factor analysis .
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, how-
ever, only the elements of the offense must be included in 
an indictment, and pleading practices vary from district to 
district . In the absence of speaking indictments, we looked 
to other documents to determine whether aggravating fac-
tors were present (e .g ., plea agreements, factual basis state-
ments, sentencing memoranda, and judgments) but those 
documents sometimes did not exist or did not provide 
additional information beyond the charges . Perhaps some 
of the nine defendants who were charged in “bare-bones” 
indictments or informations did not engage in conduct 
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that involved any aggravating factors . If so, those could 
be marginal criminal cases; we cannot tell from the court 
documents . Other than those nine defendants, however, 
there are only four defendants for whom we could not dis-
cern a rationale for the prosecution despite the availability 
of court documents that provided details about their mis-
conduct . Those four defendants were charged with negli-
gence on a single day, which may involve conduct where 
civil charges may have been more appropriate . Nonethe-
less, four defendants is an extremely small percentage of 
the 864 defendants in our database .
III. Conclusion
More than three decades after EPA hired its first crimi-
nal investigators, the prosecution of environmental crime 
remains the source of persistent claims about over-crimi-
nalization and lingering questions about the role of crimi-
nal enforcement under the environmental laws . Given the 
broad discretion that prosecutors have under the environ-
mental laws—and the erosion of bipartisan support for 
environmental protection—those expressions of concern 
are not surprising . But they point to the need for a stronger 
normative framework and a better empirical understand-
ing of criminal enforcement .
I have argued that criminal prosecution would be most 
appropriate when one or more aggravating factors were pres-
ent: significant environmental harm or public health effects, 
deceptive or misleading conduct, operating outside the 
regulatory system, and repetitive violations . My empirical 
research now strongly suggests that criminal enforcement 
has been limited in most instances to violations involving 
one or more of those aggravating factors . In 96% of the 
environmental prosecutions from 2005–2010, at least one 
aggravating factor was present . In more than 88% of those 
environmental prosecutions, the defendants caused signifi-
cant harm, engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct, 
or operated outside the regulatory system that protects the 
environment and public health . In nearly three-quarters of 
the cases, two or more aggravating factors were present, with 
repetitiveness most often the additional aggravating factor . 
These findings suggest that prosecutors have reserved crimi-
nal enforcement for egregious misconduct .
Moreover, the extent to which environmental crimi-
nals engage in deceptive and misleading conduct—more 
than 63% of those prosecuted from 2005–2010—may 
undermine claims that environmental defendants are 
well-intentioned individuals inadvertently snared by com-
plex regulations and a criminal enforcement scheme with 
reduced mental state requirements . The environmental 
regulatory system depends upon honest self-reporting; 
those who lie to conceal violations are engaging in culpable 
behavior that cripples efforts to protect the environment 
and the public from the risks associated with unlawful pol-
lution . These findings take on added significance because 
one-third of the defendants in our study were operating 
entirely outside the regulatory scheme, making no effort to 
comply with the law . Criminal enforcement is appropriate 
for defendants who deceive or seek to operate outside the 
law, particularly when their conduct risks or causes signifi-
cant harm to the environment and public health .
There were some cautionary notes revealed by our study: 
4% of the defendants engaged in conduct that involved no 
aggravating factors, and a small number of those defendants 
were charged in what appear to be pure negligence cases . 
Cases without aggravating factors and those involving pure 
negligence should receive extra scrutiny from prosecutors 
to ensure that criminal prosecution is appropriate . In addi-
tion, approximately one-fifth of all defendants engaged in 
conduct that occurred on a single day . Of course, a viola-
tion on a single day could be egregious enough to warrant 
criminal prosecution; in most single-day matters, an aggra-
vating factor other than repetitiveness was present . None-
theless, the most compelling prosecutions typically involve 
repeated misconduct, which compounds the wrongdoing 
and limits any doubt about the defendant’s intent .
Overall, however, my research should reduce uncer-
tainty about which environmental violations may result 
in criminal prosecution and quiet concerns about over-
criminalization . Prosecutors appear to be focusing on 
conduct that involves the aggravating factors that I have 
identified; when those factors are absent, criminal prosecu-
tion is unlikely to occur . Prosecutors thus have reserved 
criminal prosecution for culpable conduct and avoided 
charges based on technical violations or when defendants 
acted in good faith . Perhaps most importantly, my research 
provides empirical evidence that prosecutors have properly 
exercised their broad discretion under the environmental 
laws and assured an appropriate role for criminal enforce-
ment in our environmental protection system .
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